The author agrees with the critiques of moral theory offered by such writers as Bernard Williams and Alasdair MacIntyre, and uses ideas from Heidegger and Levinas to argue that caring is an ontological structure of human existence which takes two forms: caring about oneself (which he calls our "self-project") and caringabout-others. This dualform of caring is expressed on four Aristotelian levels of human living which the author describes and illustrates with reference to the phenomenon ofpain.
Introduction
Bioethics is often seen as an instance of "quandary ethics"'I of which the purpose is to provide guidelines for the making of difficult decisions for which there are no precedents arising from a pre-technological age. It is thought to require deductive thinking in which guidelines for a particular action are drawn from general principles or rules which tell us what it is obligatory or good for us to do. These principles or rules are said to be imperative, real, and universal and it is the task of moral philosophy, as it was of theology in the past, to tell us what they are. For their part, bioethicists combine knowledge of these obligations with knowledge of particular fields of endeavour such as medicine and health care in order to solve the practical quandaries which these fields throw up.
It follows that the quest for the "Foundations of Bioethics" would be conceived as a quest for
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knowledge of the universal principles of morality. However, there has been much discussion in the philosophical community in recent years about whether such a quest could ever succeed.2 A key point that has emerged is that theorists should be more concerned with what moves people to act well in the way of "internal" motivations rather than with what they are obliged to do because of "external" impositions of duty.3 The quest for foundations in bioethics should no longer be the quest for any such "external" set of norms.
I would argue that what we do in situations of moral difficulty or practical quandary is an expression of what we care about most deeply. It follows that a quest for the foundations of bioethics will be an exploration of the ontological being of the agent and, through this ontology, of the deepest levels of motivation within the agent.
Caring
What do I mean by "caring" in my title? Caring can be thought of as behaviour or as motivation. As behaviour the word often refers to looking after people and seeing to their needs, whether in the context of the health care professions, social work, teaching, parenting and other familial relationships, and so forth. As motivation the word can refer to being fond of someone, feeling sympathy or empathy for them, being concerned for their well-being, or having a professional commitment to seeing to their needs. It can be said that the best caring professionals exemplify both of these senses of the word.
They are good at seeing to the needs of others and they are motivated to do so by their caring attitude.4 Such a person is described as a caring person.
In contrast to these familiar usages, I propose a technical notion of "caring" in which that word designates a fundamental structure of human living which would be the basis for these caring attitudes and behaviours and also for any sense of obligation that we might experience as arising from traditional moral norms. I will be arguing that there is a basis for ethics and hence for bioethics that is more fundamental than either rules or virtues. After all, the value of rules and of virtues must be assessable. A rule is a good one of it meets standards of rationality or leads to approved consequences, and virtues are admirable if they lead to a good life for the individual and society. These further goods are a yardstick against which both rules and virtues must be measured.
My argument, developed fully in a forthcoming book,5 is that it is a mistake to appeal to some objective good to be this yardstick, whether such a good be the will of God, the Moral Law, the preferences of rational individuals, or the self-fulfilment or happiness (eudaimonia) of agents. In order for any good or principle to be a yardstick against which both rules and virtues can be measured, we must care about it. The phrase I use to distinguish this from the familiar concept of caring described above is "deep caring".
Deep caring
To use technical philosophical language, deep caring is not intentional. It is not a quest for anything specific. But it provides the impetus for all our concerns, our objectives, and our desires. Its fundamental purpose (but not conscious goal) is the formation and maintenance of both the integrity of our selves and also of our relationships with others and the world around us. I represent deep caring in this sense on the following diagram.
Most of the content of this diagram requires explication which goes beyond the scope of this paper. It might also be interesting to explore how it describes levels of human living which can be distinguished in a number of ways: as to their intellectual sophistication, as to the degree and kind of their presence to consciousness, as to their being individualistic or communitarian, and so forth. But the first crucial point to note is that these levels are levels of activity; or even better, levels of engagement with a person's environment in the richest sense of that word. The model does not represent "parts of the soul" in Aristotle's sense, as if it were describing parts of a living entity. What it is describing are levels of functioning and engagement. This is the meaning of the top line of the model in which the temporality (to use Heidegger's term) of human existence is highlighted. What this means is that a human being is constantly oriented towards the future and acting from out of its past. This notion of the temporality of human living highlights And this deep caring can be described on the four levels of the model. Many things in the world matter to us biologically. Our mothers when we are infants, the air we breathe, the food we eat, the sexual partners with whom we mate are all things that engage us because of the biological dynamic that constitutes our deep caring at this level.
Notice that it is difficult to describe these examples, especially the last, in purely biological terms. The further levels of our being and of our caring are engaged with these matters also. This is the significance of the arrow on the left of the model. A fully functioning human being does not operate on any one of these four levels by itself. To be a "whole person" (if I may use that overworked phrase) is to be engaged with the world at all four levels and to have those four levels interact with each other so as to constitute the meaning and significance of our living. I call this vertical cohesion of human being "integrity", and I suggest that integrity in this sense is the inchoate telos of deep caring. Insofar as our deep caring is oriented towards this integration of our lives, I call it a "self-project".
Integrity in my sense is not the achievement of control on the part of the higher levels of the model over the lower levels. Aristotle's model of parts of the soul was hierarchical and allowed him to say that the higher parts should control the lower. In contrast, my model is "holistic". Our breathing is not controlled by the higher levels of my model and yet is a matter of deep caring for us, as is evidenced by the shift in our priorities when we experience breathing difficulties. More ethically interesting biological functions such as sex only become a matter about which we might ask ethical questions, such as whether control should be exercised over them, after they have been shaped by all the levels of our being so as to take on ethical significance. The question of whether a sexual desire should be controlled is not a question that arises from the higher levels so as to be directed to the lower. It is a question about how one's integrity as a being which functions at all four levels should be preserved.
To illustrate the model, let us consider pain. Pain is a biological phenomenon arising from dysfunctions or lesions in the body. At level one of our being there will be the cries and grimaces that are the involuntary expressions of pain. But pain is experienced and so is lived out on the second level of our being. At this level there are not only feelings of pain and distress, but also emotions and reactions which are constituted socially and interpersonally but which are experienced as arising pre-consciously. At this level there is suffering. The involuntary expressions of my pain will be partially a function of the cultural formation that allows me to express my pain in that way. In our society, for example, men are less likely to express their pain directly than women. Pain behaviour is a learnt response and this learnt response is the expression of our deep caring about pain at the second level of our being. And, given that we are related to others at all levels of our being, another expression of our deep caring at this level will be spontaneous compassion with the pain of others.
At the third level of my model will be those many behaviours of avoidance and palliation which constitute our rational and practical response to pain, whether that pain is actually being experienced or merely being envisaged as a possibility in our lives. In the case of a particular pain episode, our visit to a doctor or our reaching for the aspirin will be our living out our deep caring about pain; our expression of the fact that pain matters to us. Further, as we move to the third level of our being, there will be individual and collective deliberations and plans, ranging from buying more aspirin to setting up hospitals. The rational basis for this collective action will be the recognition that others too can suffer pain and that co-operation is needed to deal adequately with it. The social provision of health care is a collective expression of deep caring focused at the third level of our being.
But most importantly, and most frequently neglected, there is the fourth level of our deep caring in which people will seek to integrate biological pain episodes and the sets of reactions and activities that respond to them into their conception of themselves and of their deepest values and relationships. People suffering pain will seek to understand their suffering in the context of their lives and beliefs. A religious person will see it as the will of God, whether as a test or as punishment. A secular person will see it as bad luck or as an opportunity for personal growth, and so on. The number of ways in which pain can be given meaning and made into an integral part of the narrative of a life are many and varied. We should include the ways people feel called upon to respond to the pain of others. The fourth level of our being will be the level at which the whole set of reactions, feelings and activities relating to pain will be given its meaning in ultimate terms.
Deep caring is an engagement along both the horizontal and vertical axes of my model. It is an engagement with the world, with the future and with others, but, given the vertical axis, it is also an engagement the inchoate purpose or function of which is the constitution of our integrity as whole persons. Caring is both being-for-others and selfproject. I said earlier that caring has no object; it is not intentional. I am not now suggesting that it is the true object of our caring to live out our life over time and to establish and maintain our integrity in doing so or to relate to others in determinable ways. Our goals and purposes are what they are given to us as being in our own self-consciousness (even if it may sometimes require difficult and honest reflection to discover them). But that they matter to us arises from a deeper and pre-conscious mode of our being. The caring which I am seeking to describe is not a caring about this thing or that, or about this person or that. And it is not a caring about ourselves and our integrity. If we care about anything or if we care for anyone, it is because deep caring is the very nature of our being. These familiar and intentional forms of caring are expressions of our ontological being as deep caring. The function of deep caring is to integrate our living and to give it world-relational and intersubjective meaning.
The way in which this function is exercised is for our deep caring to be given form. The things in the world, the projects, and the persons that we relate to, as well as the social solidarities and the faiths that we have, give structure and direction to our deep caring. They are important to us because they are the occasion for our inchoate caring to become focused. Our intentional concern for these things will then be the expression of our deep caring.
Implications for ethics
And so it is for ethics. Ethics is an expression of our deep caring in the sense that it is a socially constructed form through which we constitute the integrity of our being and the quality of our engagement with the world and with others. This does not imply egoism. I am not saying that while being seemingly concerned for ethical values, one is actually only concerned for one's own integrity or relationships. What one is actually, consciously, and authentically concerned with is the ethical object of one's current projects. But 9. To those who argue about whether the basic motivational structure of human lives is altruistic or egoistic, I suggest that deep caring looks both outwards and inwards at the same time. Not being intentional, deep caring cannot be described as either altruistic or egoistic. It is an ontological mode of being which is both self-project and being-forothers. This is not to deny that social formation might favour one orientation over the other. But in the hidden depths of our being, we are neither exclusively altruistic, nor exclusively egoistic. In an ideally formed human being, integrity and solidarity will be equally strong motivations.
10. There is a debate as to whether ethical obligations are "real" from an impersonal point of view. Realists would argue that impartial thinking or "the view from nowhere" gives us a surer grasp of what is morally required of us than a point of view which takes account of our particular and personal relationships and properties. I favour the personal point of view.'3 Insofar as it is our integrity and intersubjective solidarity which lie at the heart of our concerns, the scope of our moral obligations will emanate from our being so as to embrace those whom we love, for example, with greater urgency than those we do not. Moreover, insofar as we might be committed to ideals of justice at the fourth level of our being, the call upon us of those who suffer injustice will be more urgent than of those who suffer simple need.
This does not mean that the call upon us of morally salient features in a situation are not "objective". They are there to be apprehended by anyone with the educated sensitivity required to sense them.'4 The ethical formation which we receive in our communities and the ethical discourse of these communities will create a set of standards of moral excellence which will be objectively present for us in our lives.
11. My model is descriptive of our ontological being and gives an account of our obligations. As such it is not prescriptive. Rather than telling us what we should do, my model explains why we have the moral notions that we do. By showing how all four levels of our being come to expression in such notions, my model explains why ethics matters and why morally relevant situations call out to us so as to demand our response.
12. It follows from my model that moral education would not consist in the explanation of moral principles or instruction in moral theory, but in showing how the deep caring of the moral neophytes can be fulfilled in a variety of ways in a variety of situations. As opposed to a teaching that would address only the third level of our being, moral education will consist in showing what is morally salient in a situation. Rather than teaching medical or nursing students about the principle of beneficence so that they will know that they ought to respond when a patient is in pain, one would teach those students what pain is and means so that they will respond to it in accordance with all four levels of their natures as deep caring. This teaching will be phenomenological, reflective and anthropological, rather than instruction in moral theory. It is a consequence of my "internalist" position that any agent who understands a situation as involving pain that she can alleviate, will be moved to do so. If she were not so moved she would not have understood the situation correctly, with regard to its moral salience. So moral instruction must aim to enable such understanding of the situation. 15 13 But what matters is that each situation calls out to us in its own terms and calls out to all four levels of our being. What being ethical calls for is that one acts so as to constitute and preserve one's being as selfproject and as being-for-others.
14. In relation to the debate between "generalists" and "particularists", I would acknowledge the importance of the latter.'6 A generalist holds that a moral judgment or decision takes the form of a deduction from general principles or rules, while a particularist stresses the sensitive attention that a moral agent should give to the morally salient features of the situation. These approaches need not be mutually exclusive, but there is an issue in descriptive moral psychology as to which takes priority. Given my conception of human being as involving a primordial orientation towards others and towards oneself, caring attention to the situation will be a framework in which any judgment or decision takes place.
A moral agent may use moral principles to articulate her motivational stance in any given situation and she may even express her thinking during or after the decision by way of a practical syllogism, but these will be forms given to her pre-conscious deep caring. Such forms are learnt in a given culture. The rule-based ethicist says that we must make our ethical decisions on the basis of reasons. And if these reasons are to sway us, or to explain and justify our actions to others, then they must be general. That is, they must be understandable by other people in terms of how they apply to such situations in general, and agents must understand them and be prepared to apply them in other similar situations. On the other hand, virtue ethics is "particularist". What a virtuous person is able to do is to attend to all the morally relevant features of a particular situation and respond to them appropriately. She may not be able to say why she acted as she did and she may not be able to say ahead of group.bmj.com on June 17, 2017 -Published by http://jme.bmj.com/ Downloaded from time how she would act in a situation like the one at issue. Nor would she be able to say that she would act that way again in a similar situation (given that there can be morally salient differences in similar situations). 
